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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN MISSISSIPPI
by
Shirley Norwood Jones *
Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law, B.A. 1950, J.D. 1952, Univer-
sity of Mississippi School of Law.
A trust which restrains the voluntary or involuntary alienation of
the beneficiary's interest is a spendthrift trust. Many so-called spend-
thrift trusts prohibit only the voluntary assignment by a beneficiary
of his interest in the trust; some allow a voluntary assignment while
prohibiting creditors from attaching the interest of the beneficiary in
the trust property. There are two other types of trusts which are fre-
quently referred to as "spendthrift" trusts: the trust for support and
maintenance and the discretionary trust.
The purpose of this article is to trace the history of spendthrift
trusts in Mississippi and to determine, insofar as possible, the present
status of the law in Mississippi in regard to such trusts.
Mississippi has a statute which, at first reading, would appear to
eliminate spendthrift trusts within the state. This statute provides in
part as follows:
Estates of any kind holden or possessed in trusts for another, shall be
subject to the like debts and charges of the person to whose use or for
whose benefit they are holden or possessed as they would have been
subject to them if the person had owned the like interest in the thing
holden or possessed as he may own in the uses or trusts thereof,
whether the trusts be fully executed or not ....
This statute, in its original form, was first enacted in 1822, but, after
having been construed to apply only to passive trusts, it was amended
by the Code of 1857 to add the provision "whether the trust be fully
executed or not.' '2
In spite of the amendment to the statute, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has clearly interpreted this statute as applying only to passive
trusts and as having no effect on an active trust.' Mississippi has no
other statute specifically dealing with the question of spendthrift
trusts, so we are left to court decisions for the status of the law in
Mississippi on this subject.
When members of the bar speak in terms of spendthrift trusts to-
day, they are generally thinking of well-drafted provisions by which a
'MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-43 (1972).
2E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 196 (2nd ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
GRISWOLD).
'Stansel v. Hahn, 96 Miss. 616, 50 So. 696 (1909); Leigh v. Harrison, 60 Miss. 923,
11 So. 604 (1892).
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draftsman seeks to make the beneficiary's interest inalienable and
seeks to place it beyond the reach of his creditors. This is not the type
of provision that our court was dealing with in the early history of the
law in our state. The earliest cases in Mississippi dealing with the
right of creditors to reach trust property involved provisions for sup-
port and maintenance.
Text writers draw a distinction between technical "support trusts"
and trusts in which the purpose is stated to be furnishing the
beneficiary with support.4 Where the trust is to pay the beneficiary
only so much as is needed for his maintenance or support, the courts
have generally held that the interest of the beneficiary is not subject to
his voluntary alienation and cannot be reached by his creditors.5 This
is true even where there is no specific provision restraining alienation
of the beneficiary's interest.6 In the second type of support and
maintenance trust, where the settlor provides that all of the income
from the trust property, or a fixed amount of the income, shall be paid
to the beneficiary and that it shall be used for his support and
maintenance, most courts hold that the words only show motive and
find that this type of limitation does not indicate that the beneficial in-
terest is to be subject to restraints on alienation. The majority of cases
hold that, with this type of support and maintenance provision, the
beneficiary may assign his interest and creditors may reach it.7 The
Mississippi case of Leigh v. Harrison8 is cited in support of the con-
trary position. The cases in Mississippi have not attempted to draw a
fine line of distinction between the types of spendthrift trusts but
rather have dealt with the subject on an individual basis, depending
on the facts of the particular case.
As early as 1848, in the case of Lucas v. Lockhart, Fearne and
Donnegan, the Mississippi Supreme Court dealt with a trust for sup-
port and maintenance. In that case a judgment was obtained and ex-
ecution levied on slaves alleged to be the property of Mary A.
Longstreet. The slaves had been owned by her husband, James
Longstreet, during his lifetime. The second and fourth provisions of
the will of James Longstreet were as follows:
Second, Should my wife die before my youngest child now born, or
which may hereafter be born, shall attain the age of sixteen years, it is
my will that my whole estate be kept together by my executors, until
such youngest child shall arrive at that age; and that then my whole
4G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 229 (2nd ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as BOGERT]; GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 430.
'GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 431.
5H1 A. ScoT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 154 (3rd ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Scorr).
'GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 433.
'69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604 (1892).
'10 Miss. 466 (1848).
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estate be divided equally between them; should my wife marry before
my youngest child attains the age of sixteen, it is my desire that the
estate be kept together, as aforesaid, by my executors until such child
shall reach that age, and that then the whole be equally divided be-
tween my wife and such of my children as may be then living, &c., &c.
Fourth, During my wife's widowhood, she is to have the entire use,
profits and control of my estate, and to her discretion do I entrust the
education and maintenance of my children during that time; but in
case of her death or marriage before the time appointed for a division,
as foresaid, then it is my desire that my children be all supported, and
that the girls under sixteen, and the boys under eighteen be as well
educated out of the annual profits of my estate, as they will allow up to
the time of division, the profits to be first applied to their support; and
in case of a deficiency, then to educate all the children embraced in the
last clause, the balance to be applied in educating the younger in
preference to the older children.10
The proof showed that the defendant was the widow of James Long-
street, was still unmarried, and that there were children of the mar-
riage still living.
The Mississippi Supreme Court found that if, by the will, Mrs.
Longstreet had an absolute life estate in the slaves, the execution must
stand, but that if the property was subject to a trust in favor of the
children, then the slaves could not be reached by an execution at law.
While the will, by its first clause, appeared to make an absolute gift to
Mrs. Longstreet, the subsequent clauses, quoted above, were held to
show that the testator intended the gift to be a qualified one, with the
profits to be used for the support and education of the children. The
court construed the language as an imperative command that the wife
support and educate the children; the words were imperative, the sub-
ject certain, and the object equally certain, so that a trust arose for the
support and education of the children. The property could not be sold
for Mrs. Longstreet's debts as that would cut off the profits and defeat
the trust.
The case indicates that at a very early date the Mississippi
Supreme Court exercised care to protect a provision for support and
maintenance, even in the absence of language specifically establishing
a trust for this purpose.
The Lucas case did not deal with the effect of the predecessor" of
section 89-1-43'1 but the case of Presley v. Rodgers 3 held that the
predecessor statute was intended to operate upon trust estates in
which the trustees had nothing but the naked, dry, legal title, with the
10d.
"Hutch. Code, Ch. 42 § 29 (1798 to 1848).
1
2
MISS. CODE ANN. (1972).
"24 Miss. 520 (1852).
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whole beneficial interest in the cestui que trust and that it did not
apply to active trusts.
An early Mississippi case, Dibrell v. Carlisle4 held that the
beneficiary of a trust estate, having an equitable estate, had the same
powers of mortgaging or disposing of the estate as if she had a legal
estate in the absence of any limitation or restriction on the equitable
estate.
The leading case in Mississippi on the subject of a trust for support
and maintenance is the Leigh case. In that case the appellant was a
judgment creditor of one Thomas Harrison. Mrs. Regina Lee was
named trustee of a testamentary trust for the life of Thomas Harrison,
with the remainder to herself. She was to use the rents and interest for
the support of Thomas during his lifetime, and at this death the prop-
erty was to vest in the trustee individually. The will left the residue of
the estate to be divided among the five children of the testator, with
the share of Thomas Harrison to be held in the same trust for his life
and at his death to be divided among the other heirs of the testator.
The question presented was whether, under the will, Thomas Har-
rison took such an interest in the property devised in trust that it or its
income could be subjected by his creditors to a judgment. The claim
was made, on the one hand, that the law would not permit an estate to
be given to a person to be beneficially enjoyed and yet restricted so it
could not be subjected to the payment of his debts, and that, even
should it be conceded that a testatrix might by apt provisions protect
the interest created, the will in question did not do so. On the other
hand, it was contended by the appellees that Thomas Harrison did not
receive such an interest that he could anticipate the fund or assign it
because this would defeat the intention of the testatrix that the
testatrix should be able to do as she pleased with her own estate.
The Mississippi Supreme Court conceded that the English cases
support the appellant's view that whatever beneficial interest in pro-
perty a man takes may be taken by his creditors. The court found that
the English rule rests on two propositions: (1) that the limitation on
the use or enjoyment of the property is a restraintrepugnant to and in-
consistent with the estate granted so that the liability of the estate to
the debts of the owner is a necessary incident thereto; and (2) that it
would be a fraud upon creditors and against public policy that one
should be permitted to own an estate to which his creditors could not
resort. Our court held that while the first reason applied to legal
estates, however, in England, it did not control equitable estates.
Even in England, trusts for married women, so arranged that the hus-
band had no right in them, were recognized. The English courts
'48 Miss. 691 (1873). On the basis of other assigned errors the court reversed and
remanded. Upon rehearing, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed its decision on this
point in Dibrell v. Carlisle, 51 Miss. 785 (1875).
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determined that conferring no rights on a husband did not constitute
a deprivation of his rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that
the justice of the equitable rule in relation to trusts for married
women commended the further application of this rule to other cases.
Our court further stated that, even in England, the right of the
donor to provide for the determination of the estate upon the
bankruptcy of the beneficiary is recognized and upheld, as is a limita-
tion over to a third person. The donor has but to provide for the
determination of the interest of the beneficiary to keep creditors of the
beneficiary from taking the estate. Our court further stated that
creditors could not take less if the estate should be left in the
beneficiary free from the creditors' claims than if it had not been left
in the beneficiary at all. The court confessed its inability to find how
a creditor could be defrauded by the recognition of a power in a
donor to limit his bounty according to his own will. The court then
continued as follows:
The creditor has no right to the property in the hands of the donor, and
no equity that we can perceive in any disposition which the owner
may make of it. If Mrs. Harrison had given Thomas nothing, upon
what principle could his creditors complain? . . . But what law is
violated by disposing of property with a limitation which confines its
benefit to the person of the donee? It cannot be said that it is against
public policy for a testator to provide a support for a spendthrift child,
for the interest of the public is that such child should not become a
public burden. Our statutes upon the subject of exemptions indicate a
clear public policy that exemption from personal pauperism is of
greater concern than the right of creditors. A donation by will or deed
with limitations against liability to debts of the donee cannot invite to
undue credit being given to the donee, for such instruments are re-
quired to be recorded and a third person may by examination of the
public records learn the terms upon which the bounty is to be enjoyed.
The reason sometimes, if not universally, given, that the limitation is
inconsistent with the estate given, presents the most serious objection
to the validity. But as was said by Mr. Justice Miller in Nichols v.
Eaton, 91 U.S. 716: "We do not see, as implied in the remark of Lord
Eldon, that the power of alienation is a necessary incident to a life
estate in real property, or that the interest and dividends of personal
property, may not be enjoyed by an individual without liability for his
debts being attached as a necessary incident to such enjoyment..."
The doctrine that a restraint upon alienation is inconsistent with
the estate granted has no application to an equitable estate. There
should be no difference between limitations on trusts for married
women and limitations on other trusts since spendthrifts are in need of
protection at least as much as married women.
The Mississippi Supreme Court also reiterated that the Mississippi
statutes against perpetuities expressed the whole legislative will on the
"Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 933-34, 11 So. 604, 606 (1892).
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subject, so far as fixing the limit which may not be exceeded, and
stated further that they also fixed the time during which restraints
against alienation may be lawfully imposed, at least upon equitable
estates for life.
Then, discussing the predecessor of our statute,16 the court said:
The effect of this statute is to subject equitable estates to sale under ex-
ecution at the law; but since the complaint is a proceeding in a court of
equity, in which such estates might always have been subjected, we do
not perceive that anything can be added to his position by invoking the
statute. The statute can have no operation upon the estate of the
trustee, nor subject it to the debts of the cestui que trust, unless he has
an equitable estate in the property of which the trustee has the legal
title. It is uniformly held that, when an active, as distinguished from a
dry or passive, trust is created, the statute of uses does not apply. It is
equally well settled that the use remains a mere equitable estate when
an agency, duty, or power is imposed on the trustee to collect and pay
the rents, income and profits to the beneficiary .... "
Even though the will specifically provided that the trustee make
quarterly payments to Thomas during his lifetime, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that this did not exclude the power and duty of
the trustee to apply so much of the income as may be necessary for his
support and maintenance according to his condition in life. The
court pointed out that there was no averment in the bill that the fund
was more than sufficient for the support of the beneficiary. It made
clear that the ruling applied only to so much of the income as might
be necessary for the support and maintenance of Thomas and that
since the entire income was given to him, any excess would seem to be
liable to creditors. This case laid the foundation for spendthrift trusts
in Mississippi. With no express spendthrift provisions, and with the
relevant language providing simply for "support and maintenance,"
our court held that creditors could not reach the funds that were
necessary for support and maintenance.
The Leigh case has been frequently cited, both by the Mississippi
Supreme Court and by text writers on the subject of trusts for support
and maintenance.'8 Those considering Leigh have sometimes failed
to recognize that it did not contain a "spendthrift" provision in the
sense of specific language prohibiting alienation or attachment by
creditors. This decision should not be deemed to support the view
that Mississippi will allow a spendthrift trust only insofar as the pro-
ceeds are necessary for support and maintenance. Even though Leigh
recognized the possibility that funds in excess of support and
"
6 MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-43 (1972).
'"69 Miss. 923, 936-37, 11 So. 604, 607 (1892).
'8GHIswoD, supra note 2, at § 196; ScoTr, supra note 6, at 154; BOCERT supra note
4, at § 119.
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maintenance might be subject to claims of creditors, this occurred
because there was no other spendthrift provision in that case. The
decision should not be interpreted to restrict a case where a proper
spendthrift provision is contained in the trust agreement.
The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to find the existence of a
spendthrift trust in Stern v. Hampton." In this case the testator had
devised property to his widow in trust for the support, education and
maintenance of herself and her children during her life with certain
distributions to be made as each child reached twenty-one and the rest
to be divided as soon as it was ascertained that there was no
reasonable probability of litigation against the estate. The testator
died in 1873. In 1890 the children, after they had all reached majori-
ty, made a voluntary quitclaim deed of the land in question to the
widow, who then executed a deed of trust, which was subsequently
foreclosed. An attempt was made by a creditor of the widow to set
aside the conveyance or to establish a prior lien in himself. The ap-
pellants contended that a spendthrift trust existed and that neither the
children nor the widow and children together could, by any kind of
conveyance, divert the legal or beneficial title out of the trustee or
beneficiaries. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to follow this
view, stating that there was no provision in the will against alienation
or anticipation nor for forfeiture. The whole equitable interest was
vested in the widow and children, with no one else having an interest
and no devise over. On this set of facts, our court held that the case
did not fall within the principle of spendthrift trusts set out in Leigh
and in Nichols v. Eaton.20 Further referring to the Nichols case, our
court held that the beneficiaries in the Stern case had "substantial
rights" which could be voluntarily aliened.
It is difficult to reconcile the Stern case with Leigh. There was lit-
tle difference in the language of the trusts. By upholding the spend-
thrift trust in Leigh, the court kept the creditor of the beneficiary from
reaching the assets. Neither did the creditor prevail in Stern; however
in Stern it was the creditor who was trying to set up the spendthrift
nature of the trust. Leigh involved an attempted involuntary reaching
of trust assets, whereas Stern involved an attempt to set aside a
previously made voluntary conveyance. The court seems to base its
decision in Stern on the lack of any language specifically preventing
the beneficiaries from conveying, but found that was no spendthrift
trust similar to the one in Leigh.
The Mississippi Supreme Court did recognize a trust for support
and maintenance in the case of Cady v. Lincoln." This case, while
dealing primarily with another issue, recognized that where the
"73 Miss. 555, 19 So. 300 (1896).
:091 U.S. 716 (1875).
'100 Miss. 765, 57 So. 213 (1912).
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testator left a will with provision that the rents, issues, and profits of
the property be applied to the support and maintenance of his son and
grandson, a spendthrift trust was created.
Much has been written about whether or not spendthrift provi-
sions should be allowed.-- Regardless of whether or not spendthrift
trusts should be allowed, the greatest single factor in the development
of spendthrift trusts was probably the dictum of Mr. Justice Miller in
Nichols,2 a case in which the trust provided that after the bankruptcy
of the beneficiary the trustee (of whom the beneficiary was one)
should have completed discretion as to the payment of trust income,
including the power to exclude the particular beneficiary. The actual
question presented was the validity of a provision for forfeiture on
alienation, followed by a discretionary trust, and not the general
validity of a restraint on alienation; but the case contains an extensive
opinion on the subject of spendthrift trusts and asserts their validity.




The view of Nichols made the intention of the donor respected
above all other considerations.2" This view was vigorously attacked
by John C. Gray in his original work, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENA-
TION OF PROPERTY, 20 which first appeared in 1883. Gray attacked
the doctrine of spendthrift trusts, and some of his arguments have
never been completely answered. 27 The preface to the second edition
of Gray's book28 has become known as the classic statement of opposi-
tion to spendthrift trusts. Despite some merit in his arguments, Gray's
position has had little influence in changing the law.
2 9
Where, by the terms of the trust, a beneficiary is entitled only to
payments as determined by the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion,
he cannot compel the trustee to pay any part of the trust property to
him, nor can his creditors reach the trust property. This is true even
where spendthrift trusts are not permitted since it is the character of
the beneficiary's interest, rather than the settlor's interest to impose
the restraint on its alienation, which prevents creditors from reaching
the interest.3 0 This type of trust must be distinguished from a trust in
which the only discretion which the trustee has pertains to the time or
22
See J. GRAY, PREFACE TO RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1895);
GRISWOLD supra note 2, at § 9.
2391 U.S. 716 (1875).
2"See In re Delano's Estate v. Weller, 62 Cal. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672, 675 (1944);
State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W.2d 624, 627 (1944).
21GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 29.
2 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (2d ed. 1895).
2 Id. at § 32.
281d.
2 Id.
3*ScoTr, supra note 6, at § 155; GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 422.
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manner of payment. In the true "discretionary" trust, the nature of
the interest of the beneficiary, rather than any expressed restraint on
his power to alienate or on the rights of his creditors, determines ques-
tions of voluntary or involuntary alienation." Of course the discre-
tionary trust may also have specific spendthrift provisions.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that property
sometimes cannot be reached by creditors because of the nature of the
property interest devised, rather than because of any specific spend-
thrift provision. In Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank32 the testatrix devised
all of her property to her husband in trust for her six children, giving
him complete control of the property until all of the children should
reach the age of twenty-one years. Then the property would be
distributed equally among those living. The will further directed
him, in the meantime, to support the children out of the income. On
this state of facts, the court determined that a child did not have an in-
terest that could be subjected by a creditor to the payment of the
child's debt. The court refused to enter a decree directing payment
out of the amount which would be due to the child when the time ar-
rived for distribution. The court held that the will created an active
trust and that a beneficiary's interest in such a trust was not subject to
sale under execution.
The child in question in the Mitchell case was held to be vested
with an equitable title to one-sixth of the property left by his mother.
His title was subject to being defeated by his death before the
youngest child of the testatrix reached the age of twenty-one. The
court further stated:
Until the time for distribution arrives, he has no right to receive any
part of the estate, other than that which might be expended by the
trustee for his support. During the time he cannot have set apart to
him any share of the property. He has no right to use, or to control,
manage, or dispose of, any of the property devised. He has only a
beneficial interest, which will not ripen into a legal title until his
mother's youngest child shall reach legal age ...
A donor may make such disposition of his property and provision for
the application of the revenues therefrom for the support of his
beneficiaries, and bestow upon the trustee such discretion as to render
the estate, or the interest of a beneficiary therein, not liable to be sub-
jected to the payment of the beneficiary's indebtedness. A donor has
the right to devise his property for such purpose that neither the
beneficiary nor his creditors can divert the property from the ap-
pointed purpose. 1 Perry on Trust, sec. 386a. We quote from 38 Cyc.
238, the following:
"Where the property is held in trust to receive the rents or income
thereof, and to apply such rents or income to the support of the cestui
que trust, who consequently has no present right of enjoyment or
3 BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 228.
"107 Miss. 314, 65 So. 278 (1914).
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power of alienation, his interest in such property cannot be reached by
his creditors.""3
The court rejected the contention that it direct payment to the
creditor when the time for distribution to C. T. Mitchell arrived. The
beneficiary's interest was uncertain and contingent and its value
could not be ascertained. Until time for distribution arrived, the
beneficiary would receive only such amount as the trustee might give
him for his support. If he should die before distribution, he was to
receive nothing and, therefore, he did not have such property under
the will as could be impressed with a lien.
In West Tennessee Co. v. Townes, " the district court dealt with an
attempted spendthrift provision in a deed. The conveyance in ques-
tion was a deed of gift which provided that in default of heirs of the
grantees the property should descend to the right heirs of the donors.
The deed further provided that the premises would not be liable in
any manner whatsoever for the debts of the grantees.
Suit was brought by the vendee of the purchaser at a foreclosure
sale and the controversy was two-fold: (1) whether the provision was
void which provided that the grantees could not encumber the prop-
erty, and (2) whether the heirs of the grantor took under the original
deed. In discussing the attempted spendthrift trust, the district court
in Mississippi said:
Spendthrift trusts are recognized in Mississippi, as shown by the case
of Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 18 L.R.A. 49. Such a
trust may be so created that neither the trustee nor the cestui que trust,
his creditors or assigns, can divest the property from the appointed
purpose. 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees § 386, p. 649 (7th ed.).
Among other requisites in order to have such a trust, the legal title
must be vested in a trustee, the trust must be an active one, and the gift
to the donee must be only of the income. He must take no estate
whatever, have nothing to alienate, no beneficial interest in the land,
no right to possession, but only an equitable right to support an
equitable interest only in the income. Kessler v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515,
88 S.W. 66, 107 Am. St. Rep. 368, 3 Ann. Cas. 1005; Perry on Trusts,
Supra, p. 651, note 93; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 18
L.R.A. 49.
A perusal of the deed under consideration will disclose, not only that it
has none of the requisites, or features, of a spendthrift trust, but that it
is altogether lacking in the structural organism of such an instrument.
On the other hand, it contains a provision absolutely restraining the
alienation of a legal estate and seeking to put it beyond the reach of
creditors. There is no limitation over or reversion in case of an at-
tempted alienation, but only a provision that the life tenants shall not
alienate and that creditors cannot get hold of it. The restriction is
"107 Miss. 314, 321, 65 So. 278, 279 (1914).
15'2 F.2d 764 (N. D. Miss. 1931).
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void, as the right to convey and liability for debts are incidents of
property. Gray's Restraint on Alienation, § 134; vol. 3 § 2010.
Simply because the donor might have accomplished his apparent pur-
pose in a legal way, either by a spendthrift trust or a reversionary
clause, is not sufficient justification for the court to rewrite an instru-
ment conveying a legal estate, which contains a void provision
restraining alienation, and convert it into one creating an equitable
estate for the benefit of spendthrift which is protected from his
folly. ....
The court properly determined that limitations can exist on trust
estates that cannot exist in outright conveyances. This is true in the
great majority of jurisdictions.3"
In the case of Merchants' National Bank and Trust Co. v. Port
Gibson Oil Works, " the will in question made a bequest to Harry
Vick Phelps of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in trust with the
Merchants' National Bank and Trust Company of Vicksburg and pro-
vided that this sum was to be held in trust for his use and benefit. The
will further provided that one-tenth of the principal and the income
should be delivered to the beneficiary annually. Should any part of
the principal and income remain at his death, it was to go to his heirs,
share and share alike.
The beneficiary, together with his then living prospective heirs, ex-
ecuted an assignment to the Port Gibson Oil Works, which the trustee
refused to recognize. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in holding that
a trust "for use and benefit" was not the same as a trust for "support
and maintenance" stated as follows:
In the case of Dibrell v. Carlisle and Humphries, 51 Miss. 785, the
court held that "the cestui que trust may bind by mortgage or deed in
trust, or lawfully dispose of the trust estate without the assent of the
trustee, unless forbidden in the instrument creating such estate," and
this seems to be in accord with the authorities generally. This court,
however, recognizes the validity of "spendthrift trusts," or trusts
created by one with a view of providing a fund for the support and
maintenance of another, and at the same time securing it against the
improvidence or incapacity of the one for whose benefit it is created.
But there must be something on the face of the instrument indicating
such a purpose on the part of the donor or testator, and, where the in-
strument creating the trust contains no express words of restraint and
nothing on its face declaring that the purpose thereof is to provide a
support for the beneficiary and to provide him with the comforts of
life, and where it requires that part of the corpus of the trust estate and
the income from the entire estate shall be paid directly to the
beneficiary without any direction concerning its application, and
without any discretion being vested in the trustee as to the time or
"Id. at 766.
1*6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.49 (Casner ed. 1952).
"165 Miss. 314, 141 So. 283 (1931).
1979]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
amount of such payments, or the purpose of which they shall be ap-
plied, such payments may be anticipated or assigned by the
beneficiary, and by proper proceedings may be subjected to the pay-
ment of his debts.
38
The court then distinguished Leigh,3" stating that the right of creditors
to any excess beyond support and maintenance was not dealt with in
this case. Our court then pointed out that not only did the legatee
receive the use and benefit, but also one-tenth of the principal sum per
year. The court further said:
The phrase "for the use and benefit" of a named beneficiary, is not
synonymous with the phrase, "for the support and maintenance" of
such a beneficiary. Funds provided "for the support and main-
tenance" of an individual are limited to the necessities and comforts of
life for such an individual in the station in which he is accustomed to
live and move, while funds "for his use and benefit" may be applied to
much broader purposes ... "
The court found a considerable difference between support and main-
tenance and use and benefit, saying:
There is nothing on the face of the will under consideration here in-
dicating a purpose on the part of the testatrix to impose a restraint on
alienation of the legacy, and the trustees are not vested with any
discretion in the premises, but the direction to the trustees to pay one-
tenth of the principal and all the income at the end of each annual
period is absolute and unconditional. We therefore have reached the
conclusion that the trust estate created by item 45 of the will is subject
to voluntary disposition or assignment by the beneficiary, and it
follows as a necessary result that it may be by proper process subjected
to his debts.
The case of Calhoun v. Markow4' involved somewhat different
provisions. In this case, the trust provided for the payment of income
in quarterly installments to the settlor's daughter, Mrs. Dora Markow,
who was thirty years of age in 1930. Payments of income were to
continue until the daughter attained forty years of age, at which time
one-half of the property was to be distributed to her. The remaining
one-half was to be distributed to Mrs. Markow when she attained the
age of forty-five. The trust further provided that until the daughter
reached the designated age she was to have no interest in the property
except to receive the income. Neither was she to have any power to
sell, pledge, assign or encumber the property or any income
therefrom. The trust also stated that neither the property nor the in-
3 Id.
3869 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604 (1892).
"165 Miss. 314, 323, 141 So. 283, 286 (1931).
"168 Miss. 556, 151 So. 547 (1933).
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come should ever become in any way liable for any debts or obliga-
tions whatsoever which the daughter might owe. Should the daughter
die before the age of forty-five, all of the trust property in the hands of
the trustees would then belong to her children.
Mrs. Dora Markow, the beneficiary, was adjudged a bankrupt and
in 1932 the trustees in bankruptcy filed suit to obtain the trust assets.
The chancellor found that the creditors of Mrs. Markow were not en-
titled to any benefits under the trust and dismissed the bill. The
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the chancellor,
holding that it was proper under the principles announced in Stansel
v. Hahn,"2 as well as Mitchell and Leigh. The court determined that
the trust was an active trust and until Mrs. Markow reached the age of
forty (in 1940), the property did not vest in her, but remained in the
trustee with full and complete power to sell, pledge, or encumber,
concluding as follows:
We think the chancellor was correct in his holding that neither the
property nor the income were subject to her debts. The property
covered by the trust instrument belonged to Mrs. Lasunsky, and she
could deal with it as she pleased, provided it did not infringe any of the
provisions of law; and the decisions in this state show that a trust of
this kind is lawful and that it is permissible for a parent to place prop-
erty in the hands of a trustee to secure a child from poverty, want, or
misfortune, and to provide for the necessities of life for such child. A
creditor has no right to look to property in such a trust for the satisfac-
tion of his demands. Creditors are charged with a knowledge of the
law and the provisions of such trusts.'3
Even though the Markow case did not specifically discuss spend-
thrift trusts, it appears from this case that a spendthrift provision will
be recognized in Mississippi even in the face of bankruptcy of the
beneficiary and even as to a vested life interest. Where, by the terms
of the trust, a beneficiary cannot transfer his interest, it does not pass
to the trustee in bankruptcy." Of course, in the absence of a spend-
thrift clause, a trustee in bankruptcy may reach whatever interest the
beneficiary has, in any way permitted by the rules regarding
creditors' remedies.
4 5
Not all language used in trusts to limit the right of a beneficiary to
reach the trust property will keep the property from being attached by
creditors. In Clegg v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis," wherein a
bill was filed in chancery court, the material language of the trust
provided that the assets in question
96 Miss. 616, 50 So. 696 (1909).
'168 Miss. 556, 565, 151 So. 547, 549 (1933).
"ScoTr, supra note 6, at § 152.2.
'4BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 227.
"169 Miss. 578, 153 So. 812 (1934).
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[Sihall stand in trust in the executrix or any successor to her, and no
part or parcel thereof shall be sold or incumbered, during the con-
tinuation of the trust aforesaid, save and except in the instance
hereinafter provided 
7
Then another provision of the trust was as follows:
As each child shall attain its majority, it shall be entitled thereafter to
receive its proportionate part of the net income derived from the above
sources, but shall in no event be entitled to a distribution of the estate
or a partition of the real property until the termination of the trust
hereby created.4"
In 1931 when all of the children except Henrietta Scheider had
reached the age of twenty-one and Henrietta had had her disabilities
of minority removed, the children conveyed the property in question
to Mrs. Clegg. Mrs. Clegg then procured a loan from the Prudential
Insurance Company, secured by the property in question, and then
reconveyed a 1/7 interest to Henrietta. In discussing whether or not
the quoted language created such a spendthrift trust that the bene-
ficiaries could not convey their interest, the court stated as follows:
Appellants next contend that the language of the will prohibits the
courts from ordering a sale of any of these lands until the termination
of the trust, when Henrietta Scheider becomes of age. We have set out
the language of the will for the purposes of demonstrating that the
trust set up in no wise interfered with the title to the estate therein con-
ferred. The prohibition is that the devisees themselves cannot have
partition thereof until the youngest child is twenty-one years of age.
The will nowhere undertakes to provide that the interest of Mrs. Clegg
shall not become subject to her debts. There is no spendthrift trust
here, nor is the language such as that by implication a trust of that
character could be set up so as to protect the devisees' interest from
being subjected to the payment of their debts in a proper procedure.
The will does not contain any provision indicating that the interest of
the several devisees shall not become liable for such. The exact ques-
tion has been settled by this court in the case of Montroy v. Phillips,
134 Miss. (345,) 98 So. 775.*"
The court held that the property was subject to a judgment for Mrs.
Clegg's debts except as to 160 acres for homestead and that she could
validly convey an interest to Henrietta in the 160 acres which was
exempt. The court drew a distinction between a prohibition against
involuntary, as opposed to voluntary, alienation. It can be seen from
the Clegg case that both must be provided for if a settlor seeks to pro-
tect the trust assets not only from the beneficiary's own acts but from
his creditors as well.
"7Id. at 581, 153 So. at 813.
"Ild. at 584, 153 So. at 814.
"Id.
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The case of Brown v. Sperry0 held that, where a will does not
create a spendthrift trust and otherwise has no indication to the con-
trary, a debt of a beneficiary can be offset against payments due to
him under the provisions of a testator's will. The interest of a
beneficiary in a trust estate is subject to a charge for the amount of his
indebtedness unless the testator manifests an intention to the contrary.
The court stated:
The will does not create a spendthrift trust, nor in any way attempt to
remove the income of the trust estate from liability for the debts of the
life beneficiary thereof. "If a beneficiary is under a liability to the
trustee as such, his interest in the trust estate is subject to a charge for
the amount of his liability."'"
The court also said that when the income of a trust was applied to
the payment of a debt due by the beneficiary to the trustee, the bene-
ficiary was not thereby deprived of the benefit of the income, and then
stated significantly, "If the will had provided not that the income
should be paid the beneficiary without any restrictions thereon, but
that sufficient thereof should be paid her for her support and main-
tenance, a different question would arise, as to which we express no
opinion. '- 5 Here again, the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly in-
dicated that the words "support and maintenance" alone are suffi-
cient to exempt the part of a trust needed for support and main-
tenance from claims of creditors.
A settlor cannot create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit even
in jurisdictions where spendthrift trusts are permitted." This is true
whether or not he is solvent at the time the trust is created..4 It is con-
sidered to be against public policy to permit a man to tie up his own
property in such a way that he can enjoy it and still keep his creditors
from reaching it. The cases are uniform in holding that, apart from
statute, a person cannot create a spendthrift trust for himself which
will be effective against the right of his subsequent creditors.ss In
general both present and future creditors can attack an attempt by a
settlor to create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit.5 6
What assets creditors can reach where an attempt has been made
by a settlor to create a trust for himself is another question. Where a
settlor reserves to himself only income and provides for a vested re-
mainder in others, the vested remainder is beyond the reach of cred-
itors, but courts are unanimous in holding that the life interest can be
" 182 Miss. 488, 181 So. 734 (1938).
"Id. at 495-96, 181 So. at 736.
"Id. at 496-97, 181 So. at 736.
"SCoTT, supra note 6, at § 156.
14BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 223.
"GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at § 474.
"BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 223.
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reached by creditors of the settlor s7 If, in setting up a trust, a settlor
has reserved only an income interest, it is only this interest that can be
reached by his creditors.9 " Neither is a restraint on the alienation of
the interest of the beneficiary valid if the beneficiary is creator of the
trust. 59
The most extensive discussion by the Mississippi Supreme Court
about spendthrift trusts involved a trust in which the settlor retained
an interest. This recent case of Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Walter E. Heller ° held that a trust agreement was subject to the
claims of the appellee, a creditor of the grantor. A suit was filed by
the appellee to collect a judgment recovered against the administrator
of the grantor's estate.
Tryon B. Allen, the grantor, had previously been adjudged mental-
ly incompetent, but he was restored to competence after agreeing
that, if he were restored, a trust agreement would be executed placing
all of his property in trust, with certain exceptions not material here.
A trust agreement was made and Deposit Guaranty Bank and Trust
Company of Jackson, Mississippi (now Deposit Guaranty National
Bank) was named trustee. Tryon B. Allen conveyed to the trustee a
large amount of property. One of the provisions of the trust was that
the income from the trust estate should be paid to the grantor in
monthly or other convenient installments during his lifetime. Upon
his death the trust should terminate and the trustee should distribute
the remaining trust property to the grantor's nephew, Arthur D.
Allen, III, a minor.
The trust also provided that the trustee, upon the written request
of the grantor and upon the written approval of an attorney named as
advisor, should withdraw and pay to the grantor from the principal of
the trust estate an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of the fair
market value of the trust estate in any one year. In fact, this authority
was never used and the grantor never withdrew any part of the prin-
cipal of the trust. It was also agreed that the trust would be recorded
in the office of the Chancery Clerk of Hinds County and that the
recording would constitute notice that neither the corpus of the trust
nor any part of the income therefrom should be liable for or subject to
any note or other written evidence of indebtedness or judgment
against the grantor after the date of recordation. The grantor agreed
not to execute any such notes. Article IX of the trust provided that:
"The trust shall not be subject to attachment or garnishment or execu-
tion by reason of any debt or other obligation of Grantor.""'
After the trust went into operation the grantor engaged in a coin
67GRISwOLD, supra note 2, at § 475.
"BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 223; SCOTr, supra note 6, at § 156.
"SCoTr, supra note 6, at § 150.1.
6204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
6 Id. at 858.
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operated laundry business and applied for credit, representing that he
had the right to withdraw twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00)
per year from the trust and listing the trust fund among his assets. The
trust was in fact recorded, but the exhibit listing the property included
in the trust was omitted from the recording. The creditor had written
to the trustee stating that the grantor had applied for credit in the
amount of some sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000.00), and the trustee
had replied that "reasonable credit accommodation would be pro-
vided in a satisfactory manner.""2 A copy of the financial statement
which the settlor had given to the appellee was also sent to the trustee.
No objection was made by the trustee. In discussing the instrument in
question, our supreme court said:
It is obvious, as the chancellor held, the said instrument - on its face
and according to the testimony of the lawyers preparing same - was
executed in order to prevent future debts from depleting the grantor's
estate. The chancellor found it to be a spendthrift trust, and voidable
as to creditors. He held the trust to be void as against public policy,
since the grantor had the right to invade the corpus of it and to receive
the full amount of it.
Of course, as between the parties the trust is valid, and no question
would be raised in the absence of creditors. This instrument was clear-
ly intended, as we view it, to conserve the estate and prevent the inva-
sion of the corpus by creditors, existing or future63
The court then pointed out that the trust allowed the grantor to
withdraw twenty-five percent per year and that the trust was in ex-
istence from December 27, 1961, until the grantor died on August 24,
1965. During that period of time the grantor could have withdrawn
the entire corpus at the rate of twenty-five percent per year. The
court went on to state:
It is obvious.., that a spendthrift trust was intended with the right of
the grantor himself to invade the corpus. A spendthrift trust for the
benefit of the grantor is invalid, both as to past and future creditors,
even though there is a provision for a contingent remainder in a third
person. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 26 (1955).
In Bogert, Trusts and Trustees section 223 (2 ed. 1965), it is said
that if a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and inserts a spend-
thrift clause, it is void as far as then existing or future creditors are
concerned, and they may reach his interest under the trust. Many
cases uphold this doctrine. In this same section, it is interesting to note
this statement:
Both existing and future creditors may be misled into believing that
their debtor's financial situation is sound, because he continues to enjoy
the fruits of his property and perhaps is in actual possession of it,
2Id. at 859.653 d.
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although it has been conveyed by a secret trust instrument to be held
for the debtor. (Bogert, supra, at 667).54
The Mississippi Supreme Court then quoted from Scott on Trusts as
follows:
Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts are permitted, the set-
tlor cannot create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit. If the owner
of property transfers it in trust to pay the income to himself for life or
for a period of years, and provides that his interest under the trust shall
not be assignable by him and that his creditors shall not be permitted
to reach it, nevertheless he can effectively assign his interest and his
creditors can reach it. It is immaterial that in creating the trust the
settlor did not intend to defraud his creditors. It is immaterial that he
was solvent at the time of the creation of the trust. It is against public
policy to permit a man to tie up his own property in such a way that he
can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching it.
Where the only interest which the settlor has created for himself under
the trust is a right to the income for life or for some other period, it is
this interest alone which his creditors can reach, unless the creation of
the trust was a disposition in fraud of his creditors. Where the settlor
has an interest in the principal, this interest can be reached by his
creditors. This is true, for example, where a trust is created under
which the income is payable to the settlor for life and on his death to
his estate, or where the income is payable to him for a term of years at
the expiration of which the principal is payable to him or to his estate.
The policy underlying these decisions seems clear. The owner of pro-
perty can properly create a trust under which a third person takes a
beneficial interest, and the creditors of the settlor cannot reach this in-
terest unless the creation of the trust was a fraudulent conveyance. To
the extent to which the settlor himself takes an interest under the trust,
however, that interest is subject to the claims of his creditors even
though the creation of the trust was not a fraudulent conveyance. It is
against public policy to permit the owner of property to create for his
own benefit an interest in that property which cannot be reached by
his creditors."s
Our court quoted from RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959), to the
effect that creditors of a settlor can reach a trust set up for his own
benefit though it be a trust support or a discretionary trust. The
creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the
terms of the trust could pay or apply for the settlor's benefit.
The interest which can be reached is not limited to creditors which
were in existence at the time the trust was created. Both present
creditors and creditors existing thereafter may attack a spendthrift
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held that since the grantor had the right to reach the funds in the trust,
creditors had the same right to reach them. A debtor should not have
funds available to him and at the same time bar his creditors from
reaching them. The existence of a non-adverse advisor did not alter
the situation, nor did the fact that no withdrawals were actually
made.
The Mississippi Supreme Court quoted from the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Jamison v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co."6 as follows:
The creditors of the beneficiary of a trust have no right to complain of
a gift to the beneficiary which restricts the use in such manner that
they cannot reach it. The creditors of the donor only are concerned.
This is the foundation of the right to create a spendthrift trust. But it is
different when the debtor himself attempts to create a trust in his own
favor in his own property. He cannot settle property in that manner
and provide conditions against its being subject to the payment of his
own debts, even though he provides for a contingent remainder in
third persons.7
Certainly our court has aligned itself with the great majority of
jurisdictions in recognizing the validity of spendthrift trusts but
limiting these trusts to those created by a grantor for someone else.
Clearly it seems that in the State of Mississippi a spendthrift trust
can be created for the support and maintenance of one's wife,
children, or other beneficiaries and that, so far as funds are needed for
"support and maintenance", they will be protected from claims of
creditors. Further, a trust can provide that it cannot be reached by
creditors (assuming that it is for someone other than the grantor) and
this alone will not keep the beneficiary of the trust from voluntarily
transferring his interest. There are spendthrift trusts in the sense of
trusts which cannot be reached by creditors of the beneficiary, and
there are spendthrift trusts which are for the purpose of keeping the
beneficiary himself from transferring the interest. Apparently both
will be enforced in Mississippi. We must bear in mind, however, the
limitation on any attempt by a grantor to set up a spendthrift trust for
his own benefit.
Courts generally take the position that if "A" is going to make a
gift to "B", who had no right in the absence of this gift to the property
in question, then whatever "A" wishes to give to "B" and however
restricted he wishes to make it (within certain limitations, such as the
rule against perpetuities), creditors of "B" cannot complain. "B" had
nothing to start with, so whatever he acquired under the trust is that
much more than he had in the beginning. The situation is entirely dif-
"6207 S.W. 788 (Mo. 1918).
"204 So. 2d 856, 862 (Miss. 1967).
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ferent, however, if "A", even at a time when he has no creditors, seeks
to place his property that he can engage in risky enterprises and still
keep the benefits of his property. The court will not allow a grantor-
settlor to protect himself by the creation of a spendthrift trust even
where the grantor-settler has no creditors at the time the truth is
created. A settlor should not be allowed to engage in risky enterprises
at the expense of his creditors alone.
Some of the finer points which arise over spendthrift trusts have
not yet been litigated in Mississippi. Some states have statutes which
specifically provide for certain dependents of a beneficiary of a spend-
thrift trust to be able to reach the interest of the beneficiary. 8 In other
states the same result has been reached through case law."9 A number
of jurisdictions have held that the United States can reach the interest
of a beneficiary in a spendthrift trust for a tax claim. 0
Most of the jurisdictions which have considered the subject allow
a spendthrift restriction on income as well as on principal until such
time as the income or principal is actually paid over to the bene-
ficiary."1 While an attempted transfer of a beneficiary's interest in a
spendthrift trust is generally treated as void7 2 and while a trustee need
not respect such a transfer, courts have protected trustees who, pur-
suant to an order of the beneficiary, have paid over the proceeds of a
spendthrift trust as directed by the beneficiary."3
With the exception of Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Walter
E. J. Heller Co., 4 most of the cases which have arisen on spendthrift
trusts in Mississippi have considered trusts with very limited language
setting out the spendthrift provisions (most merely providing for sup-
port and maintenance or providing that the property could not be
sold, etc.). Certainly, well-drafted spendthrift provisions could do
much to protect a beneficiary's interest not only against the bene-
ficiary's own inclination to spend the trust's assets, but also against
claims of his creditors.
"See KY. REV. STAT. § 381 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 (1950); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 456:080 (1969); OKLA. STAT. tit.60, § 175.25 (1971); WIS. STAT. § 701:06
(1973).
"See Garretson v. Carretson, 306 A.2d 737 (Del. 1973); In re Chusid's Estate, 301
N.Y.S. 766 (1969). See also 11 SCOTTS ON TRUSTS, § 157.1 (3d ed. 1967).
"Jackson v. D'Avbin, 316 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1975); Leuscher v. First Western
Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1958). See also II SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 157.4
(3d ed. 1967).
"In re Setrakian's Estate, 3 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960): Hitchens v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 66 A.2d 93 (Md. 1949). See also BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 222 (2d ed. 1965).
"In re Estate of Vaught, 34 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1967); Baker v. Vermont Bank and Trust
Co., 342 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965). See also BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 226 (2d ed.
1965).
"Minot v. Minot, 319 Mass. 253, 66 N.E.2d 5 (1946); Bursch v. Bursch, 60 N.Y.S.
2d 633 (1930).
'204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
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Recognized almost everywhere is the spendthrift provision which
provides that the trustee will have discretion to pay the proceeds to
other persons in the event the beneficiary becomes bankrupt or his in-
terest is subject to levy. This differs from a trust which simply has an
outright provision that the property will not be subject to claims of
creditors. The first type of trust is universally recognized while
recognition of the second type is somewhat more limited, although
both appear to be recognized in Mississippi.

